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Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of immigration on labour productivity in Canada. Immigration
is a factor that has been largely ignored in the literature on Canadian productivity growth. A
simplified growth accounting approach is utilized to estimate the reduction in labour productivity
in Canada (as measured by GDP per worker) that can be attributed to the poor performance of
post-1990 cohorts of immigrants in the labour market (as measured by average earnings as
reported in the 2006 census). It is estimated that immigration accounts for 2.23 percentage
points, or about a fifth, of the 10.96 percentage point post-1990 increase in the Canada-US
labour productivity gap.
JEL Classification Codes: J24 – Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor
Productivity; O47 – Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country
Output Convergence
Keywords: productivity, recent immigrants to Canada, immigration policy, immigrant labour,
human capital
1Introduction
Productivity has become a central focus of Canadian public policy discussions. Immigration is
often said to be necessary to raise productivity and to enable Canada to compete successfully
internationally. The exact mechanism involved is usually not stated other than through
favourable reference to the benefits of immigration in opening Canada to new ideas and markets.
And indeed, it must be admitted that there are many very prominent people who came to Canada
as immigrants and who have made major contributions to the development of the economy. On
the other hand, Robert Putnam has recently apologetically raised the possibility that immigration
reduces social solidarity and social capital (Putnam, 2007, p.137). And it should be evident that
this could undermine productivity as social capital contributes to human capital, which along
with physical capital, are factors of production. These impacts, however, as important as they
may be, cannot be easily quantified and productivity research has thus tended to focus on that
can be more readily measured.
This paper reviews some of the key facts about productivity. And it notes that immigration is
never mentioned as a factor tending to depress productivity. It then goes on to apply the
methodology of growth accounting to calculate an estimate of the impact of recent immigration
on productivity. This in turn calls into question the wisdom of the Government’s immigration
policies as part of any evidenced-based strategy to improve the living standards of Canadians.
The Importance of Productivity
Productivity is considered to be very important by economists. As Andrew Sharpe (2010, p.10),
an economist who has long studied the issue, wrote in a recent survey of Canada’s weak
productivity performance:
Productivity is by far the most important driver of living standards for Canadians. This is because
real income can only increase in the long run if more real output is produced… While increased
productivity growth is generally associated with higher wages, it also brings to life a new world of
possibilities for Canadians. Higher productivity means that Canadians will be able to meet the
fiscal pressures associated with an aging population. It means the possibility of more health care
funding. It means that workers will have the option of benefiting from increased leisure. In short,
productivity growth is vital to the economic success of Canadians.
The Canada-US Productivity Gap
Productivity growth in Canada has increasingly been falling behind that in the United States.
While GDP per worker in current US dollars is not the best measure of productivity as it
incorporates inflation as well as real increase in output, it is often used for purposes of
comparison. By this measure, the productivity gap between Canada and the United States, after
remaining relatively stable for decades up to 1983, began to rise significantly thereafter with the
increase accelerating after 2000 (Chart 1).
While a number of factors have been adduced to explain the growing Canada-US productivity
gap, Sharpe (2010, p.14) observes that “Diverging productivity trends in Canada and the United
States are even more puzzling given the similarity of output growth trends.” His conclusion is
2that:
There exists no consensus on the reasons for the weak productivity performance of the Canadian
economy since 2000. While many studies have attempted to identify the effect on productivity in
Canada of a host of microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, far fewer studies have focused
specifically on the recent productivity performance of Canada.
The growing gap between productivity in Canada and the United States has broad implications
for Canada’s ability to compete in increasingly competitive international markets and for
Canadian living standards. Indeed it has been a major source of concern among policy makers in
Canada for many years.
In spite of all the recent attention on Canada’s relatively slow productivity growth, the important
issue of the implications of the poor labour market performance of recent cohorts of immigrants
for productivity growth has yet to be analyzed and quantified as a possible factor.1
This paper seeks to remedy this deficiency and to present a preliminary estimate of the
magnitude of the possible impact of immigration on productivity using a standard tool in the
economist’s toolbox.
The Theory of Growth Accounting
The tool is the standard growth accounting model popularized by Edward Denison (1962; 1979)
and used by the Macdonald Royal Commission on the Economy in Canada (Royal Commission,
1985). It is a theoretical framework that readily lends itself to analyzing the impact of
immigration on productivity. Based on the Swan–Solow theory of economic growth (Swan,
1956; Solow, 1956), growth accounting decomposes the sources of output growth amongst the
various factors of production using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function.2 This
approach can be adapted to incorporate any number of factor inputs including capital, energy,
and labour. Total factor productivity is measured as a residual after the contributions of all other
inputs are accounted for. The contribution to output of different kinds of labour can be estimated
using relative wage (or earnings) weights reflecting the productivity of different types of labour.3
This is based on the neoclassical assumption that wages (or earnings) are determined by the
1 Nakamura, Nakamura and Diewert (2003) presented a framework for analyzing the potential impact of
immigration on productivity. While they reviewed the data on the poor earnings performance of recent immigrants
from the 1991 and 1996 censuses, which is the raw material of any estimate, they did not go the next step and use
the data to produce an estimate of the impact of immigration on productivity.
2 Y=AKL where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour and  and  are capital and labour’s share
respectively. This production function has the convenient property of being linear in the logarithms of output, capital
and labour, which can be interpreted in terms of percentage changes.
3 The Macdonald Commission (1985) used this technique to estimate the impact on economic growth of
changes in the composition of labour. Specifically, it focused on the age-sex mix of the labour force, education and
inter-industry employment shifts. In addition, Nakamura, Nakamura, and Diewert (2003, p.28) concluded that their
“analysis suggests that the use of a wage weighted aggregate for the labour input of workers of different types rather
than a simple sum of hours of work will be an improvement for considering the impact of immigrants on the
productivity of the nation.”
3marginal productivity of labour and reflect the contribution of the worker to output.
An Estimate of the Contribution of Immigration to the Growing Canada-U.S. Productivity
Gap
The methodology of growth accounting is used in Table 1 to estimate the decline in labour
productivity that can be attributed to the poor labour market performance of the post 1990
immigrant cohorts. An understanding of the basis of the estimate can best be understood by
going through the table in detail line by line.
Lines 2 to 4 shows the total number of new immigrants who came to Canada over the 1991-95,
1996-2000 and 2001-04 periods as reported by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Line 5
column 3 provides an estimate of the number of immigrants that came between 2005 and 2010. It
takes the actual numbers for 2005-09 and adds an estimate of 260,000 for 2010 based on the
Minister’s statement that the number for this year would be at the upper end of the 240,000 to
265,000 range given earlier (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010, p.3). It is noteworthy
that over the twenty years from 1991 to 2010 about 4.7 million immigrants were admitted to
Canada (line 6 column 3). This represents 13.7 per cent of the Canadian population of 34.1
million as of July 1, 2010 (line 7 column 3).
Lines 9 to 11 show the show the number in the various post-1990 cohorts of new immigrants
who have employment income as reported in the 2006 Census. This is a proxy for employment,
which is higher than employment from the labour force survey as it incorporates everyone who
had employment income any time during the year even if they did experience unemployment
over the course of the year. Line 12 provides an estimate of the number of immigrants entering
the country between 2005 and 2010 with employment income in 2010. It is made assuming that
the same increase exhibited in the administrative data between the 2001-2004 and 2005-2010
cohorts also applies to the census data (line 11 column 3 times line 5 column 3/line 4 column 3).
Line 13 column 3 shows that 2,359,575 new immigrants from the four cohorts are estimated to
earn employment income in 2010. Line 14 provides an estimate of the total number with
employment income in 2010. And line 15 shows the number with employment income
excluding the four cohorts of new immigrants. This is the total that provides the most relevant
base for measuring the increase in employment resulting from post-1990 immigration.
Lines 17 to 20 column 3 shows number of new immigrants in the four cohorts of new
immigrants with employment income as a percentage of the total population with employment
income as well as the total for the four cohorts of new immigrants. In total, the four cohorts of
new immigrants account for 12.58 per cent (line 21 column 3) of the total excluding themselves
(line 15 column 3).
Lines 23 to 25 column 2 display the average employment income of the three cohorts of new
immigrants in 2005 as reported in the 2006 census. Line 26 column 2 shows the average
employment income of the non-immigrant population in the same year. Lines 28 to 30 column 2
show average employment income for each of the three cohorts as a percentage of the total
average employment income of the non-immigrant population calculated by dividing lines 23 to
25 by line 26. It is assumed that these same proportions will hold over the 2005 to 2010 period
4(lines 28 to 30 column 3) and that the same proportion 65.72 as experienced by the 2001-04
cohort in 2005 will apply to the 2005-10 cohort in 2010 (line 31 column 3).
It is worth noting that the employment income of the different cohorts of new immigrants ranges
from 16.25 to 34.28 per cent lower than that of the non-immigrant population. This provides a
measure of the relatively lower productivity of new immigrants that is used to calculate the
overall reduction in productivity resulting from post-1990 immigration. More precisely, this is
done by applying the gaps in employment earnings to the product of labour’s share (estimated to
be 67 per cent) and the number of new immigrants with employment income as a percentage of
the non-immigrant population with employment income. This yields lines 33 to 36 column 3,
which are the estimates of the overall reduction in productivity resulting from the poor labour
market performance of recent cohorts of immigrants.
According to the analysis presented in Table 1, the decline in the productivity of labour as
measured by GDP per worker over the whole 20-year period from the four post 1990 cohorts of
new immigrants was 2.23 per cent and growing over time. While this may only amounts to about
a tenth of a percent lower growth per year, the small annual reduction adds up to a relatively
significant decrease by the end of the period and ends up accounting for over 20 percent of the
10.98-per-cent increase in the Canada-U.S. gap in GDP per worker recorded between 1990 and
2009. This is, of course, not to deny that the deterioration could have been even greater if there
had not been a similar deterioration over the same period in the labour market performance of
new immigrants to the United States, many of whom were illegal and had not completed
secondary school. And it doesn’t say anything about the impact of the many other factors
affecting productivity that have been identified by others and that have both increased, but most
reduced, Canadian productivity, and can be used to explain the remaining 80 per cent of the
increase in the productivity gap.
The 2006 census data revealing the poor labour market performance of recent cohorts of
immigrants are cause for concern, especially when combined with the continued high level of
immigration after 2005, which is planned to persist indefinitely in the future. Growth accounting
suggests that immigration will continue to have a large and growing negative impact on labour
productivity, which will only cease when the immigrants that are selected and admitted are able
to earn at least as much as non-immigrants. Given that the largest proportion of immigrants are
not selected based on their skills, but rather are dependents of economic class immigrants, family
class immigrants or refugees, it doesn’t appear likely that new immigrants will earn as much on
average as non-immigrants in the foreseeable future. Thus immigration can be expected to exert
a continued depressing effect on productivity.
As an aside, it will unfortunately no longer be possible to monitor the impact of immigration on
productivity using the census as the data on the earnings of immigrants utilized in this paper
comes from the census long form which is being eliminated in the 2011 census. But, at least for
the present, the data from the 2006 census provides a clear indication that from an economic
point of view Canada’s immigration program has lowered productivity growth and has
contributed significantly to the growing productivity gap with the United States.
5Other Possible Negative Impacts on Productivity from Immigration
It is worth mentioning here that there are other possible negative impacts that the high recent
levels of immigration could be having on immigration that have not been taken into account. One
stems from the depressing impact that the increased labour supply resulting from large inflows of
immigrant labour can be expected to have on wages. It must be admitted that wage growth in
Canada has been very weak for the last 20 years. And lower wages lead to substitution of labour
for capital and other factors of production and in general lead to a greater number of workers
being employed. Martin Collacott (2003, p.25) noted that U.S. studies have shown the
availability of cheap labour has made industry less willing to invest in labour-saving
technologies and that the same thing could be happening in Canada. This would increase the
denominator of the GDP per worker relationship lowering this particular measure of
productivity. Unfortunately, the estimation of the impact of wages on the demand for labour is
extremely complicated, involving the estimation of sophisticated econometric relationships, and
is thus inherently somewhat subjective. Thus, for the present, it will have to suffice to merely
raise this particular possible cause of slow productivity growth as a candidate for future research.
Another possible negative impact of immigration on productivity is that, at least in the short run,
it decreases the amount of capital available for each worker to work with and lower the capital
intensity of the economy. Rao, Tang and Wang (2003, p.31) attributed 12 percent of the Canada-
U.S. labour productivity gap in the business sector in 2000 to the lower intensity of capital. In a
later paper (Rao, Tang and Wang, 2004, p.5), they revised their estimate up and attributed 30
percent of the gap in 2001 to the same factor. The important thing about these studies is not the
precise values of their estimates, but that they indicate that Canada lacks capital relative to the
United States. Such a lack can only be exacerbated by a high level of immigration as most
immigrants do not bring with them all the capital that will be needed to employ them
productively.
And Don DeVoretz (1999, pp.18-24) has raised the possibility that the influx of highly skilled
immigrants to Canada has accelerated the outflow of Canadian workers who were even more
highly skilled by keeping wages low. This too could have an adverse impact on productivity.
Possible Positive Impacts on Productivity from Immigration
In addition to the possible opening up of Canada to new ideas and markets, there are other
arguments that have been made that immigration can raise productivity. But the empirical
analysis supporting these arguments has been done with respect to the United States. In
particular, Peri (2009) analyzes state-by-state data to show that immigration raises productivity
and income per worker. The main mechanism through which this works is that lower wage
immigrants take manual-skill jobs and push native workers into better paying communication-
intensive jobs utilizing their superior language skills. The functioning of this process of task
specialization, which Peri argues explains half to two-thirds of the increase in productivity, is
further explored in Peri and Sparber (2009). A necessary condition for such a positive impact to
occur is that immigrant labour has to be complementary to domestic labour in production. But
even if Peri’s analysis were valid for the United States (and there are grounds for skepticism), it
is unlikely to apply in Canada where a much larger proportion of immigrants are selected on the
6basis of skills and education.
The Government’s Plan to Increase Growth and Prosperity
The previous government published a discussion paper in the fall of 2005 entitled A Plan for
Growth and Prosperity, which acknowledges at the outset that “future increases in our standard
of living will depend in large measure on further improvements in the productivity of our
economy.” (Department of Finance Canada, 2005, p.7). The plan, which is still being pursued by
the current government, involves efforts to: improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our
immigration system; increase immigration of skilled and educated workers; and improve
immigrant integration (Ibid., p.82). The underlying assumption is that it is possible to increase
the immigration of skilled and educated workers to maintain labour force growth (Ibid., p.69).
The fly in the ointment is that only 17 per cent of immigrants are actually selected under the
skilled worker program and that they bring with them or sponsor family members who do not
have the same level of skills and who usually perform worse in the labour market. To actually
increase productivity, immigrants have to be more productive than existing workers in Canada,
which, given that earnings reflect productivity, means that they must earn more than existing
workers. If the Government were to only admit such immigrants, it could justifiably claim that
immigration policy was productivity enhancing. However, Since there is no indication that the
Government only intends to admit immigrants likely to achieve a higher than average level of
earnings,there is no way that the government’s proposed immigration policy can conceivably be
portrayed as helping to lower the Canada-U.S. labour productivity gap.
A Final Word
Don't believe anyone when they tell you that immigration is raising productivity or that it is
likely to reduce the Canada-U.S. productivity gap. A careful analysis of the data using the
standard analytical tool of growth accounting in the most simple and straightforward way
possible shows that this just isn't true. As the American humorist who called himself Artemus
Ward said, “It ain’t so much the things we don't know that get us in trouble. It’s the things we
know that ain't so.”
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Table 1: Estimate of Decline in Overall Productivity Resulting from Poor
Labour Market Performance of Post 1990 Immigrant Cohorts
2001-04 2005-10 Est.
1. Total Number of New Immigrants from CIC Adminstrative
Data
2. Cohort of 1991-95 1,181,565 1,181,565
3. Cohort of 1996-2000 1,033,716 1,033,716
4. Cohort of 2001-04 936,862 936,862
5. Cohort of 2005-10 (Est. for 2010) 1,510,063
6. Total for Cohorts from 1991-2010 3,152,143 4,662,206
7. Total Population end of period July 2005 and 2010 32,359,000 34,108,752
8. Estimate of Number of New Immigrants with Employment
Income
9. Cohort of 1991-95 573,995 573,995
10. Cohort of 1996-2000 548,800 548,800
11. Cohort of 2001-04 473,530 473,530
12. Cohort of 2005-10 (Est.based on 2001-04 Cohort) 763,250
13. Total for Cohorts from 1991-2010 1,596,325 2,359,575
14. Estimate of Total Number with Employment Income 18,201,265 21,113,065
15. Estimate of Total Number with Employment Inc. ex.
Cohorts 1991-2010 16,604,940 18,753,490
16. Number of New Immigrants with Employment Income as
per cent of Total Employment ex. Cohorts 1991-2010
17. Cohort of 1991-95 3.46 3.06
18. Cohort of 1996-2000 3.31 2.93
19. Cohort of 2001-04 2.85 2.53
20. Cohort of 2005-10 (Est.) 4.07
21. Total for Cohorts from 1991-2010 9.61 12.58
22. Average Employment Income
23. Cohort of 1991-95 30,534
24. Cohort of 1996-2000 29,272
25. Cohort of 2001-04 23,961
26. Average Employment Income of Non-immigrant
Population 36,457
27. Employment Income of Immigrant Cohorts as per cent of
Non-immigrant Population in First Year of Period
28. Cohort of 1991-95 83.75 83.75
29. Cohort of 1996-2000 80.29 80.29
30. Cohort of 2001-04 65.72 65.72
31. Cohort of 2005-10 65.72
32. Estimate of Percentage Reduction in Productivity
33. Cohort of 1991-95 0.38 0.33
34. Cohort of 1996-2000 0.44 0.39
35. Cohort of 2001-04 0.65 0.58
36. Cohort of 2005-10 0.93
37. Total for Cohorts from 1991-2010 1.47 2.23
11
Notes: Employment Income ratios from Census Data are assumed to stay at 2001-04 levels in 2005-10.
The total population with employment income for 2005-10 is assumed to grow at same rate as
employment from the labour force survey from the 2005 level.
Source: The Citizenship and Immigration Canada administrative data on landings can be found at:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/permanent/01.asp.
The 2006 Census data is at:
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-
eng.cfm?TABID=1&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=01&GK=1&GRP=1&
PID=96279&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=81&
VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF= .
